The paper analyzes in constitutional and institutional economic terms Joseph's economic policies, such as changes to property rights arrangements for farming, the introduction of a barter tax on crop production, and the multi-layered bureaucratic hierarchies of Egypt. Utilizing Buchanan's approach to constitutional economics, I argue that these policies lowered attack/defense costs as they arise, when a group attempts to escape from the natural distribution state (the "war of all", as Hobbes called it). A key thesis is that this encouraged interacting parties, already on the grounds of self-interested choice, to engage in societal contracting out of the "war of all," thereby reaping mutual gains.
I. Introduction
The paper analyzes the ways in which institutional and constitutional economic concepts can illuminate the great success Joseph enjoyed in Genesis at the top of Egypt's industrial hierarchies. Initial ideas on this topic originated from Wagner-Tsukamoto 1 . The means of better setting out and fairer guaranteeing of property rights for interacting parties, and crucially through preventing the ad-hoc confiscation of property from subjects, a potential tactic used by rulers. The stories of Joseph needed to be critically analyzed, since his policies manipulated property rights in manifold ways, which at first glance may even have appeared to be confiscation policies. Mutual gains are analyzed in this way as increases in economic performance and the generation of cooperation is approached in economic terms for the Egyptian-Israelite society: increases in economic performance being shared amongst the interacting parties (between "subjects" and "rulers"; and between Egypt and Israel).
Methodologically the paper is grounded in the so-called textual, narrative approach. My analysis of the biblical text is independent of questions of authorship and independent of historiographic issues, e.g. as to whether the stories of Genesis reflect actual, past events in space-time. I outlined this methodology in detail in previous papers. 5 Through textual, narrative analysis, I inquire into key purposes and key explored Joseph's success in economic terms, regarding how he applied himself to constitutional ordering and the running of a society at an institutional level. The approach is therefore much more secular than the one we encounter in mainstream biblical studies.
The political narrative nature of the stories of Joseph has long been noted, 11 although such attempts have not been linked to political economic sciences, i.e.
constitutional and institutional economics, but remained in a literary or theologically oriented genre of analyzing plot construction as such. Therefore, the present paper closes a gap in the literature by venturing into constitutional and institutional economic reconstruction.
Initially, in the first part of the paper, I briefly introduced key concepts of constitutional and institutional economics as they are then applied in the paper. In subsequent parts, the paper analyzes the stories of Joseph for constitutional and institutional economic themes and motives. To close, a final part summarizes and presents conclusions of the paper.
II. The Natural Distribution State, Property Rights Regimes, and Mutual Gains
Buchanan's approach takes, in a similar fashion to Hobbes, the "war of all" as the analytical starting point regarding how a group of interacting parties can overcome this Third, in addition to these textual, analytical arguments, I also argue that the concept of the war of all (the natural distribution state), is heuristically needed for understanding strategies of theory building from an institutional economic point of view.
In this heuristic perspective, we can theoretically reconstruct the stories of Joseph in institutional economic terms-and the theory outcomes have to justify such a heuristic endeavor in terms of conceptual fruitfulness, significant substance, and critical persuasion. A key thesis in this respect is that any social theory-whether derived from In Genesis, Egypt is depicted as an affluent society, already so when Joseph enters this society. A key question is whether Joseph's policies helped to maintain and increase the wealth of this society, and whether wealth was shared within this society, and also with
Israel once it had emigrated to Egypt.
Without explaining the policies in detail at this point (which will follow below), it is sufficient to note that Joseph's anti-cyclical policy of crop taxation and crop storage reduced and even eliminated the destabilizing threats of economic downturns. Wealth, which had been accumulated in previous periods, was protected for the Egyptian society.
This benefited the subjects and the rulers of Egypt. The release of crop into the economy in times of downturns provided farmers with crop seeds for ongoing farming projects. This contributed to continued wealth creation in this society. The economic release of stored crop-against payment-also benefited the rulers, providing ample income even in times of downturns. Such income could be used for funding state projects, the maintaining of a military, legal and judiciary apparatus, etc.
Furthermore, Joseph's re-organization of property rights for farming, which saw the transfer of property in land into the hands of the pharaoh, benefited the Egyptian society as a whole (This policy is analyzed in detail below). The key reason for this is that it made economics of scale feasible for agriculture, while at the same time property rights to fruits from farming, i.e. crop yields ("profit"), were still held by farmers (apart from a barter tax that was collected on crop production). apparatus-which guarded Israel both from internal civil unrest and from external aggressors.
In summary, the Egypt depicted by Genesis was a wealthy and pluralistic society; it was economically highly developed and supported by bureaucratic hierarchies and free markets; for instance, yields from farming were freely traded. Subsequently, the paper discusses specific economic policies and costs in relation to institutional change that can illuminate the abundant economic success Egypt enjoyed in Genesis. 
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In summation, we can conclude that the re-organization of farmland directly benefited the people, their wealth being fostered. Increases in wealth at the level of the individual farmer, with higher crop yields generated and higher income available, also benefited those who administered and ruled Egypt. Prosperity generally increased, and with it the scope to trade with international partners; the scope for taxation also rose (see below); and stability of this society was enhanced: What Buchanan calls "distances" between rulers and the ruled, 32 were reduced from both "directions". Mutual gains were realized-and this is the normative goal of institutional and constitutional economic intervention.
A critical question in this connection is, of course, whether the state, which so substantially had drawn property rights into its sphere of control, could be trusted regarding the new set-up of property rights regimes, especially regarding the potential threat that fruits of farming would be ad-hoc confiscated by the state. Do we still face at this point of story-telling an "authoritarian Egyptian empire," 33 and the pharaoh appearing as a "tentative tyrant" and "determined despot" 34 leviathan-type accusations against rulers in the stories of Joseph? As has already been indicated, this paper sides with the latter thesis. The subsequent argument regarding the barter tax system, and regarding bureaucratic hierarchies, further defined on economic grounds why attack/defense costs and transaction costs over claims to property rights had indeed fallen for all members of the Egyptian society (because of Joseph's policies).
This implies that cooperation emerged on economic grounds, benefiting all members of society that were portrayed in the stories of Joseph.
B. Institutional Economic Policies and Cost/Income Implications: Barter Tax on Crop Production and Crop Storage
One qualification applies regarding the above statement that farmers in Egypt were allowed to keep fruits from their farming activity: A very significant institutional change introduced by Joseph was a twenty percent barter tax on crop production (Genesis 41,34; 47,24.26). Property rights in fruits from farming were curtailed in this manner. First, mass storage in the hands of a few (in basic: a state monopoly) allowed the build-up of so-called "asset specificity" 38 (i.e. lowly or even non-transferable capital), not regarding the capital "corn" as such, which is a comparatively basic and lowly asset specific good. Rather, asset specificity developed for human know-how ("human capital") on effective corn storage, e.g. regarding the maintenance of the silos, climate control in the silos, pest control in the silos, etc., and, importantly, regarding quality control and delegation costs relating to these activities being performed by a state bureaucracy. providing the service of "crop storage", could be expected to be less efficient and less effective. The storage business as such yields only costs-as long as the economy is in a boom and growth cycle, and the state would be naturally interested to keep boom and growth cycles as long lasting as possible and recessions as short as possible. For market providers of a corn storage service this raised a considerable problem: Economic returns for a storage service were extremely difficult to predict in terms of timings. This made this economic activity potentially quite hazardous for smaller operators. Possibly, the service "crop storage" could even be considered a "public good" in this respect, which only a state agency could effectively provide, especially through cross-subsidizing such activity in times of boom, when the state, too, would incur only costs for corn storage. Storage through individual farmers and the "in-house" production of this service could be expected to be even less efficient because of the kind of investments, quality control costs, and delegation costs this would incur for the individual farmer. Second, another key cost mechanism which favored crop storage through a state monopoly relates to economies of scale ("mass storage"). Because of mass storage, storage costs on a per capita basis decreased. This kind of economic advantage could be returned to farmers once they had to buy corn from the state in downturn cycles. Lower corn prices, in turn, also impact the potential for civil unrest in a society, reducing such a potential and with it the occurrence of attack/defense costs as they mark out the natural distribution state.
Third, quality control costs (as parts of transaction costs) could be expected to be low for farmers when they purchased corn from the state, the state being a comparatively trustworthy seller. Such costs could be expected to be much lower than when purchasing from the market place with little or no knowledge available to the buying farmer as to how the seller had stored crop over time, which affects the quality of crop, especially when used for seeding in farming projects.
In summary, Joseph's policy of a barter tax on corn and the storage of corn in large state-run silos had numerous economic effects on Egyptian society. Because of the availability of corn in downturns, the threat of anarchy and costly conflicts was significantly reduced. Also, a state monopoly on corn storage lowered costs for individual farmers in various ways, especially regarding quality control and delegation costs, and regarding cost effects of economies of scale relating to mass production of the service 29 "corn storage". In this way, taxation benefited the people, and this happened in a different manner than providing a "law and order" service as such, through taxation.
C. Institutional Economic Policies and Cost/Income Implications: Egypt's Tall, Bureaucratic Hierarchies
The Egypt of Genesis was defined by tall, bureaucratic hierarchies, reflecting its large state apparatus, including an administrative, military, and judicial apparatus. Joseph's career path in Egypt, which moved him through various levels of this hierarchy until he reached the top, reflects these multi-layered structures amply. 40 An important question is whether these tall hierarchies were merely self-serving manifestations of the reign and power of Egypt's rulers (i.e. the pharaoh, and also Joseph), or whether economic effects, especially the lowering of attack/defense costs and transaction costs, can be used for explaining the tall, well developed hierarchical structures of Egypt's state.
In light of the kind of services the state hierarchies provided, in particular regarding tax collection (and tax "storage", especially corn), administrative services, or military, legal and judicial services, the argument can be raised that attack/defense costs were lowered: Civil disputes and civil unrest were resolved and prevented through this apparatus, and in this way attack/defense costs decreased. This argument also applied in Hierarchy also has an important transaction cost effect regarding the credible guarantee of property rights: Hierarchy or "bureaucracy" delegates and disperses power in considerable degrees from the top downwards, and tall hierarchies achieve this to a greater degree than "flat" administrations. The potential for ad-hoc rule changes for the sole advantage of a ruler or rulers (i.e. the pharaoh, Joseph) is thereby constrained.
Property rights structures, which in the story of Joseph especially reflect the fruits from farming, gain in this way additional credibility, and transaction costs regarding the protection of property fall for individual members of society. State hierarchy as such could, at least to some degree, assure farmers that fruits from farming were quite safe (and that barter taxes would be returned to farmers once needed). Rulers could be better trusted not to renege on property rights promises, specifically regarding the confiscation of fruits from farming. Other specific institutional structures, as they were administered 31 by this hierarchy, had a similar effect, specifically the barter tax system and the crop storage system that was linked to the barter tax.
North and Weingast discussed this issue in terms of the necessity to credibly guarantee property rights by constraining a ruler in institutional terms, which they largely However, the critical question is whether this is the sole or most significant reason why we should see the emergence of state hierarchy. The present paper, drawing on the textual analysis of the stories of Joseph, suggested in this respect that state hierarchy exerts an important power constraining effect on rulers, and state hierarchy is 45. Baker, Bulte and Weisdorf, "Origins of Governments," p. 217.
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instrumental in executing economic policies of the state (in the Joseph stories: land reform; barter tax policy). Regarding the latter, state hierarchy has to be viewed in terms of its inter-connectedness with the economic policies it administers, and policies which in the stories of Joseph served to directly benefit the people.
Another important point I would like to make regarding the non-leviathan behavior of Egypt's state hierarchy, was its openness: Access to work in the state bureaucracy was granted to foreigners, and promotion in the state hierarchies was not linked to ethnicity, i.e. being Egyptian, but to skills and ability only. Joseph himself was the premier example, starting out as a slave in Egypt, and reaching the top of the Egyptian state bureaucracy.
To sum up, the strong hierarchical stratification of Egypt's state bureaucracy, as depicted in Genesis, lowered attack/defense costs and transaction costs in numerous ways. Through better institutional intervention that reduced the potential for internal and external disputes, the state hierarchy reduced attack/defense costs at the level of the individual societal member, also acting to lower transaction costs by better guaranteeing and safeguarding property rights. In addition, hierarchy as such, with Joseph in an umpirelike fashion at its top, reduced transaction costs by better constraining rulers (i.e. the pharaoh) from ad-hoc, confiscatory rule changes.
VI. Conclusions
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Various economic benefits were accrued by Israel through relocating to Egypt: escaping from drought and famine back in its own homeland; participating in economic policies masterminded by Joseph and the gains that this yielded; being protected by the institutional and constitutional structures of Egyptian society (and saving on costs in this regard of setting up its own state structures); being able to better integrate into one nation, which was facilitated by the pluralistic, diverse nature of Egyptian society. Such enhanced integration lowered attack/defense costs and internal coordination costs (transaction costs) for Israel as a national entity-already in their exile in Egypt-, but even more so once the Israelites began to set up their own state.
In the course of the economic reconstruction undertaken in this paper, it became clear that the economic policies instigated by Joseph were highly inter-connected. His land reform was implemented and supervised by the bureaucratic hierarchies of Egypt, and his barter tax system reflected the necessity of the property rights arrangements linked to land reform, i.e. the upholding of a property rights system that allocated to individual farmers fruits from farming for the land they looked after. It can be seen, by looking at each of Joseph's policies in isolation, as has been done in the present paper, that the specific and different nature and purpose of economic intervention and the cost savings effects that came with them for society as a whole became very clear. This substantially qualifies and curtails the suggestion of divine influence in the stories of Joseph.
On the other hand, even stronger support to view Joseph as an economic hero comes from the institutional and constitutional economic reconstruction undertaken in this paper in relation to the various policies that involved Joseph: the crop storage policy, the barter tax policy, and the stratification of Egyptian society through tall government bureaucracies. As the paper outlined, these policies prevented or at least substantially lowered the potential for the "war of all", and the high attack/defense costs individual members of a collective would have to face should civil unrest or even civil war break out.
Indeed, Joseph's policies not only prevented a relapse into the natural distribution state, but also had positive economic effects on the Egyptian society as a whole: lowering transaction costs as this resulted from better trusted property rights structures, e.g. the state's promise of fruits from farming being retained by individual farmers, and the receding threat of destabilizing effects from economic downturns. Joseph's policies created such an environment for economic exchange, in which contracting was secure, or at least much more so than was the case prior to his reign. As a result, his policies increased mutual gains for all involved, for both subjects and rulers, and for both Egypt and Israel, with peaceful cooperation being sustained and mutual gains
prospering. This is all the more a remarkable achievement, since these groups did not share religious beliefs. This achievement, and the diverse, multi-cultural society it reflects, structures, and "level 3 ordering" which is geared towards (economic, private) contracting as such. 55 The paper suggests that a basic dilemma model undergirds the stories of Joseph:
Despite no war actually breaking out, the threat of war and destructive anarchy is still ever-present. This argument can be put forward not only on grounds of heuristic necessity of political economic theory building and theory analysis (and any analysis of social theory that deals with questions of organizing order in a society 56 ), but also on grounds of the substantive, conceptual economic reconstruction undertaken in this paper. The threat of economic downturns loomed menacingly in the background; Joseph's policies (i.e. his land reform, his tax policy, and the tall, bureaucratic hierarchies he ran) implied and revealed, once viewed from an institutional and constitutional economic angle, the threat ofcostly-anarchy. This insight built on the observed reductions in attack/defense costs, and lower transaction costs resulting from better guarantees of property rights within Joseph's economic policies, directly causing the threat of anarchy to recede (the taming of the "war of all").
Further support for the thesis that we find a dilemma model of anarchy as an underlying and grounding element of the stories of Joseph comes from the Book of gains 58 . In this way, Exodus underlines a hero thesis and a climax thesis for the stories of Joseph-theses which in my view can be upheld not only for the Book of Genesis, but also for the Torah as a whole (extending to an economic hero thesis for Solomon as well 59 ).
As it has been stressed in the constitutional and institutional economic literature, some type of controlling mechanism is required that credibly constrains a ruler to exercise absolute power and renege on promises previously given to subjects: Only if this is the case, does the lowering of attack/defense costs and transaction costs become feasible. In Therefore, we can boldly conclude that from bygone millennia, the Old Testament continues to convey modern, significant, political, normative messages to today's society.
